

C II  
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

ASSEMBLY NAME/PAK NUMBER: LATCH FOR PAYLOAD BAY 20292-01  
 Reference: 111ABEIL  
 Prepared by: C. Hartman  
 Superimposing Date: 8/88

Approved by: M. Pelkey  
 Date 1/89 Rev: A

NAME P/N QUANTITY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSIS	FAILURE EFFECT	RAIIONAL FOR ACCEPTANCE
Latch Pin Eaddy 10100-10044 02 Item 5.1 Box	1/1	<p><b>5. ITEM:</b> Loss of Fether Cord, Spit Ring, Swivel or Trough Hood.</p> <p><b>CRUSIS:</b> Defective or damaged cord or adhesive. Defective swivel, swivel ring, or spit ring. Tornail</p>	<p><b>END ITEM:</b> Latch Pin Assembly separates from Eaddy. Loss of one Latch Pin - and Hex Pin.</p> <p><b>SPC INTERFACE:</b> Unable to secure one Payload Latch.</p> <p><b>MISSION:</b> Complete EVA with exception of one Latch Pin installation. Unable to secure one latch.</p> <p><b>CREW/VEHICLE:</b> Vehicle damaged by loose latch during reentry. Loss of crew and vehicle.</p>	<p><b>A. DESIGN:</b> The lather cord is made of kevlar 15 cords, 5 ply which has a breaking strength of 300 ± 10 lbs. The cord is attached to the swivel ring using a surgeon's knot. To preclude loosening, the knot is completely coated with 2-part clear Epoxy which is mixed, applied and cured in strict accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shell life of Epoxy is carefully monitored to eliminate unacceptable deterioration.</p> <p>The lather swivel is an old-the-shell stainless steel ball bearing swivel designed to carry a carriage load of 200 lbs.</p> <p>The Latch Pin Eaddy is stowed in a foam cushion in the Payload Bay PSA to protect it from the possibility of damage from impact.</p> <p><b>B. TEST:</b> Component Acceptance test - During assembly process of the A ft. retracting lather, the lather cord is functionally tested for five cycles.</p>

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10107-70

CIL  
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

ASSEMBLY NAME/PART NUMBER: LATCH PIN CADDY/AL159 20292 48  
 Reference: (FLAC)IL  
 Prepared By: L. Hartman Approved By: M. Mithrey  
 Superseding Date: D/00 Date 1/89 Rev: A

NAME P/N	QTY	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
Latch Pin Caddy MIL-10044-02 Item S.1 Doc	171	S.1FR08 Loss of Lether Cord, Split Ring, Swivel or French Hook.		<p>PDA Test -                      The following tests are conducted at the                      Latch Pin Caddy assembly level in accordance                      with ILC Document 14107-20690:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Lether cord is extended and retracted to                              verify proper operation.</li> <li>2. Functional test of French hook.</li> </ol> <p>Certification Test -                      During Certification testing the lather Cord exhibited an average                      tensile strength of 98.5 lbs (Ref. ILC Document 14107-201221).                      During Design Verification testing for Latch Caddy lather near                      the cord withstood 20,000 cycles with only moderate fraying and                      no breakage.</p> <p>C. INSPECTIONS                      Components and material manufactured to ILC                      requirements at an approved supplier are                      documented from procurement through shipping                      by the supplier. ILC incoming receiving                      inspection verifies that the materials received                      are as identified in the procurement documents,                      that no damage has occurred during shipment                      and that supplier certification has been                      retained which provides traceability information.</p>

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CEL  
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

ASSEMBLY NAME/PART NUMBER: LATCH PIN ERDDP/10159 20202 01  
 Reference: LICARCEL  
 Prepared by: C. Hartman  
 Superceding Date: N/A  
 Approved By: H. Wilkey  
 Date: 1/89 Rev: A

NAME P/N QUANTITY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
Latch Pin Caddy (1000)-10040 02 Item 5.1 One	1/1	3. IFM/0 Loss of Lather Card, Split Ring, Swivel or French Hook.		<p>The following NIP's are performed during the Latch Pin Caddy manufacturing process to assure the failure causes are precluded from the fabricated item:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The issuance of Epoxy adhesive is controlled by inspection.</li> <li>2. Verification that Epoxy adhesive shell life is within specification.</li> <li>3. Verification that Epoxy adhesive is properly mixed and cured per manufacturer's instructions.</li> <li>4. Verification of proper operation of swivel.</li> <li>5. Inspection of components for damage or material degradation.</li> <li>6. Verification of proper installation of French Hooks.</li> <li>7. Inspection of Kevlar Card for damage or fraying.</li> </ol> <p>During PDA, the following inspection points are performed at the Latch Pin Caddy Assembly level in accordance with LIC Document 10107-70070:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Visual inspection for damage or material degradation following functional test.</li> <li>2. Verification of conformance to drawing.</li> <li>3. Verify successful completion of functional test.</li> </ol> <p>8. FAILURE HISTORY: None</p>

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CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

ASSEMBLY NAME/PART NUMBER: LATCH PIN CADDY/10119 20297-01  
 Reference: LICARCEL  
 Prepared By: E. Hartman Approved By: R. Withey  
 Superseding Dates: 8/88 Date: 1/89 Rev: A

NAME P/N QUANTITY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RAISONNE FOR ACCEPTABLE
Latch Pin Caddy 10119-10000 02 Item 5.4 One	(2)	S. 1490-B Loss of Latch Cord, Split Wdg. Switch or Franch Root.		<p>E. GROUND TURNAROUND:          During ground turnaround, in accordance with          ILC Document 10107-70113, the 4 ft. retracting          tether is disconnected and the tether cord is          replaced and retested.</p> <p>F. OPERATIONAL USES</p> <p>1. Crew Response          PRE/PDS1 EVA - N/A          EVA - If possible, attach Latch Pin to wrist          tether to prevent loss. If Latch Pin is lost,          attempt to remove unpinned latch from Payload Bay          rails and transport to crew compartment for          reentry storage.</p> <p>2. Training          Crew trained in generic EVA Ops.</p> <p>3. Operational Considerations          Minimal impact. Tool usefulness unaffected.          Tool may require additional time.</p>